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Introduction 
The purpose of any comparison between the economic development 
of 18th and 19th century Europe and Less Developed Countries. 
(LDCs) today is a dual one : It shall give some insights in the・ 
general structure of the economic development process, and, m 
pursuing this, provide some feasible blueprints for the economic 
development policy of the LDCs today. The relevance of the 
comparative study depends on the relevance of the explaining 
variables and relationships chosen for the comparison. In this 
study the relationship between the populat10n variable and various 
economic key variables 1s dealt with. Surprising enough, little 
research has been done on this sub3出t. There is a substantial 
body of literature on population, less on population and economic 
development, considerably less on comparative studies of early 
Europ田neconomic development and LDCs, and virtually a quantite 
neglzgeable on comparative studies of this kind which put the 
relationship between population growth and economic development 
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in the center of their inquiry. 
The empirical data m this study refer mostly to Europe, includ-
ing, however, some references to the USA, Australasia, and Japan, 
whenever it adds to the emp1口田Iclarification or vividness. 
Similarly, al LDCs are usually included, but particular attention is 
given to the Asian Developing Countries when the empmcal data 
.suggest a specified treatment. 
I. Different levels of per capita prodnct 
Before analysing the relationship between economic development 
oand population growth in a dynamic context, attention shall be given 
to the difference in the imtial absolute value of this key variable. 
The levels of p町田pitaincome in the industrialized countries at 
・the time before their take off (1500 1750) were considerably higher 
cthan the corresponding levels of per capita mcome in the Less 
.Developed Countries today. Estimates on the basis of backward 
projections of national income data reveal that the p町田pitaincome 
・Of presently Developed Countries Western and Central Europe, 
North America and Oceania - ranged well above $ 2C D (m 1952-54 
prices〕Evenin Russia, the late comer in developing, the per capita 
;income around 1885 w田 probablymore than $150 (in 1952-54 
,prices) (1). PHYLLIS DEANE estimates that incomes in England 
in the 18 th century were closer to those of Argentina or Chile 
.today than to those of India or Burma today. (See Table 1〕
The p町田pitaincomes of a large part of LDCs are below the 
・s2co四nge(See Table 2〕.The absolute level of per回目taincomes 
.determmes the level of other economic variables, like the investment 
・rate and the savmgs rate which determine, m turn, the growth 
crate of the per capita mcnmes. 
I. Patterns of population growth 
1. Let us first make a short exposition of the definitions and the-
.oretical relationships on which our empirical analysis is based. Any 
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Table 1 ; Contemporary Estimates of the National Income 
the Umted Kmgdom in the Nineteenth Century 
Average Domestic Estimate of 
money exports as trend in 
Year and deriva- national percentage average real 
hon of national Population, mcome, national incomes 
income estimates in millions 玉じ income 1800=100 
19 13 100 
1812 ～JS.4 -22 10 94 
1822 21.3 17 10 114 
1831 24.l 23 7 174 
1836 25.4 2<l 8 168 
1841 26.8 21 11 145 
1846 28. 0 21 10 160 
1851 27.4 23 13 193 
1860 28.8 33 14 234 
1867 30.4 28 21 205 
1870 31.3 31 22 222 
1879 34.3 _35 18 274 
1880 34. 6 33 19 278 
1882 35.2 36 21 296 
醐 f 3o .5 36 18 307 
1886 36.3 34 18 326 
1889 37 .2 35 19 342 
1895 39.2 36 16 402 
1902 41.9 42 16 405 
Sour~~v~th.f~！s Deane，“The Industrial Revolution and Econo 
mic Gr Evidence of Early British National Income 
Estimates，” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. V, 
No. 2, Janua~；N~~：~o~~oted in: Higgins, Benjamm, Economic 
Developmen 1968, 1j_'o~~· (Allowance to be made for 
changes in price I色velindex US $300) 
change m population, ,p, over a penod of time is dete口ninedby 
the births, B, d田ths,D, and migration during that period of time. 
Excluding migration we get 
"P=B-D. 
Relating the absolute change of population to the total populat10n 
we get the relative change, and multiplying by 100 the percentage 
change 
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Table 2 : Selected Less-developed Countries by Growth m 
Gross National Product and Level of Per Capita 
Income 
GNP Per Capita (1967) 
GNP Ccowth 
Rot<, A"""'! 
A、erage S!OO to $200 t。 $300 to $500 No 。f
(1960-67) Uodor SIOO oodoc $200 oodoi $300 oodoc $500 '"d mm Coootci" 
Ab°'e 6% s白othKom El S•lvodor Niomgoe Cmoo 19 
M,.r;,,.;, Iron Pero Grem τ. 1叩d r,-.,y eo., Imel 
Jordon Lib yo 
Cbi,.(T•iwon) M田＂。
p,,,,., 
Spem 
Trmidod & 
Tob•go 
Yug°'I"" 
5-6% Gumeo Boli'1e Hood,,,, eo，，町田 13 
M•l•wi Sy<>• )roq Guotem•I• 
P•ki;ten UんR. M•faym 
p,,., & 
New Guineo 
Turkey 
4-5% Ethiopia Eeuodor Brm! G•bon Chile 13 
Tmania Ken,, 白Iambi• Leh'"'" 
Ph.hppin" Poraguey Veoeml• 
Z•mhi• 
3 4% Ind" Ceylon Do mm"'" Gur'"a 13 
N>goria 白ngo(B) Republie Jon曲目
Ma<oeeo Gh'"a 
Sud•n Liberia 
Ugonda Tuni;ia 
Bel。w3% Borma Cameroon Al germ Argentina 1 
Coogo(K) Indon.,ia Senegal u,.goay 
Heiti 
Mali 
Somalia 
Source: World Bank, qu。tedin Pearson(ed) Partners in 
Development, New York, Washington, London, 1969, p. 360/361. 
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r.~100. B 100. D 倫一一一, p p 
予iscalled the en 帥 rate(CBR), ￥血 crudedeath r批
(CDR〕．
In the followmg empirical analysis, the mam tr田dsin r. of the 
Table 3 : Equivalent Average Annual Rates of Growth Express・ 
ed in Per Cen.t Per Annum, Selected European 
Countries, 1815-1925 
Countr/'1 
Period 
1815-1870 1870-1925 
Germany 1.0l(bl 0.98（叫
Austria 0.72 0.60 
Hungary 0.58 0.67 
Switzerland 0.84 0.76 
France 0.41 0.14 
Belgium 0.85 0.68 
Netherlands 0.95 1.37 
Great Britain and Ireland 1.11 0.77 
Scandmavia 1.09 0.82 
Spain and Portugal 0.79 0.47 
Italy 0.68 0.60 
Balkan Peninsula 0.61 0.83 
Roumania 1. 70 1.27 
Poland 1.30 1.13 
Russia 0.43 1 .• 06 
Europe, Total 0.71 0.78 
Source: Computed from Helmut Haufe, Die Bevoelkerung Euro・ 
pas (Berlin, 1936), Table 9, p. 227, by use of the formula P,=P。
(1+r) ',where P。＝mitialpopulatwn, P,=population .at final date, 
z =number of years elapsed between observatwns, and r=equi-
valent annual rate of growth. 
a The boundaries of the countries m this table are, in most 
cases, those of 1914, For more detailed descrrpllon see Haufe. 
b Only the first two digits are significant owing to rounding 
error. (Applies to al figures.) 
Quoted in; Hoselitz, Bert, Advanced and Underdeveloped 
Countries: A Study in Development・ Contr・asts, in: The Transfer 
of Inslltutions. 
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European countries in their md1ユstrialization.Phase叩 din the LDCs 
are first compared, while m the three chapters to follow the 
explaining variables are analyzed. 
2. A comparison of the population growth rates of the Europ田n
countries at the time.when they were undergoing industrialization 
〔table3) and of the LDCs today 〔table4), or, e.g., of the ECAFE・ 
coiitries today (table 5〕showthat the population growth rates 
are considerably higher in the later two than in the former. 
.The average annual rate of popuiation growth in Europe ・from 
1815-1870 was 0. 71%, and from 1870-1925, 0. 78%. In contrast, the 
average rate of annual growth of population in the ECAFE region 
during the 1950’s in the first development de回 dewas 2. 2% and it 
Table 4 : Estimated and Pro.jected Population, by Regions, 
in Millions 
The World 
Less'Developed Regions 
East .Asia (ex. Japan) 
If Mainlarid East Asia grows 
at rate projected for South 
Asia: 
The World 
Less-Developed Regions 
E手此 Asia(ex.Japan) 
South Asia 
Melanesia, Micronesia & 
Polynesia 
Africa 
Latin America (ex. Tern・ 
perate South America) 
Average Annual Growth 
Rate: 
Medium Projection 
1960-2000 
1.8 
2.1 
1.3 
2.0 
2.4 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.6 
2.9 
Source: Overcoming百iVorld}lunger, (ed) Hardin, C. M., 
London 1969, p. 16. 
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Table 5 : Populat10n growth rates of the ECAFE region, estima・ 
tes and projections, 1970-2000 
Region and countries 
ECAFE region 
A 
B 
Asian part 
A 
B 
Oceania part 
A 
B 
Growth rate 
1970-1980 1980-2000 
2.2 
1.8 
2.3 
1.8 
2.1 
1.9 
1.8 
1.0 
1.8 
1.0 
1.7 
1.4 
Source: Demographic situation in the Ecaferegion, POP/ AFC. 
2/3P / 1,report by -the ECAFE Secretariat, October 
1972. 
Note: A series for 1970-1980 are medium variant projecti-
ons as・ prepared by the United Nat.ions Population 
DlVlsion. 
A series 2000 and B series 1970-2000: tentative pro-
jections prepared by the ECAFE Pop_ulation 
D1vision,.pendfog further returns from recent 
censuses. 
is expected to reach a peak_ of 2. 3% durmg the second development 
-decade, 1970~1980.. The ayerage growth rate of population in ECAFE 
countries is expected to be 2% for the second half of the century. 
When European countnes underwent their industrialization, their 
population growth rate was about half as high. 
:!. According to the definition of populat10n growth, the differences 
m the growth rates are to be explained by differences in the bi社h
rates, CBR, and the death rates, CDR. In the period 18出日一1970,
advanced countries experienced constantly fallmg CBRs, while the 
CBRs m the LDCs over the last 120 y回目havebeen constant around 
the high level of 1850 (fig・1〕.At present it is estimated that the 
.CBRs for thedeveloping. Asian countries are approximately 36.to 37 
per 1000 (5). 
In 18 th and 19 th century Europe there were well established 
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Fig. 1 : Birth Rates Advanced and 
Pcrl,0~0 
Population 
40 
30 
20 
10 
.0 
1850 
Develop mg Countr res 
Developing Countries 
Advanced Countries 
1900 1950 1970 
Soum・ International Demogcaphio StatIBt>" Conte; ,Bu,oau of the Cmu.. 
quoted m Populatioo P"g"m A"iatanoe,AgenoJ lo, International 
D"e!opment, Waahrngton, Deoomh" 1971. 
Note ' Ratea lo' 1850 1920 boaed on the Cm-Saunde'5 Wiloox Population 
eatimatea,.,d fo, 192060 on Umted Nationa eatimatea.Ratei fo, 
1960・70dedved by g"phi<_,lly extrnpolating t"nd linea f。＇1950-
60 exoept rn oaae。tfoeloprng c。unt"eabfth rnte,th<a "" 
aaaumed to hm dedrned to about 40 '" 1.000 by 1970. 
social mechanisms which led to a decline in the CBRs. The 
predommant soctal unit has been the nuclear family-husband, wife, 
children-as opposed to the extended farmly system preva1lmg in 
developing countries, e g , Asian countries. In田 rlyEurope a m叩
usually married only when he could afford to support his fam!ly. 
Mor田V町， ageand frequency of marriage were usually determmed 
by his economic potential. In Switzerland, e. g , often only the eldest 
son was able to marry because he inherited the farm or the father’s 
business; and thus, was able to support his family adequately. In 
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developing Asian countries marriage does not necessarily entail the 
estabhshment of a new individual household since the newly married 
couple and their children may be integrated into the existmg family 
clan. We can conclude that the constant decline of仕ieCBR in the 
process of European development was _an important factor deter m司
mmg the declme in the population growth rates If a similar declme 
in the population growth rates of LDCs should be achieved, under 
the 芦田entCBRs only an incr回目 inthe death rates, CDRs, could 
yield this result. This is not what happ田edin the past, nor it is 
expected to happen in the future. 
4. The CDRs show m 18th and 19th century Europe an incom-
parably slower d配linethan the CDRs in the developing countries 
today. Figure 2 indicates that the declme of CD Rs in advanced 
countries in the time from 1850-1970 was smaller than the decline 
Fig. 2 : Death rates Advanced 
and Developing Countries 
Perl,000 
Population 
40 
30 
20 
16 
.0: 
1850 
Developing Countries 
., --
1950 i9o 
source see Fig. 1 
1970 
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of the CDRs in the LDCs from 1910-1970. In the ECAFE report 
the四 p1ddeclme in the mortality悶teis thought of as the “major 
factor in・ the acceleration of the 四teof growth of population 
during the last two de田d田 inthe countri田 ofthe region”（6). 
It is estimated that the CDR at pr田entis approximately l~ 
to 14. per 1000. The contrasting patterns in the四t田 ofchange 
can be easily explained by the fact that chang田 intbe CDR 
are mainly a function of medical progr由民 LDCs today田ndraw 
from an existing stock of medical knowledge which was not available 
at the time of their田 r]y industrialization in . the advanced 
countries, but which has accumulated slowly over the last 200 years 
The effects of medical progr.田son the CDRs have been distributed 
over 200 y.曲目 m advanced countn田， while m LDCs today the 
efi田 tsof medical prog児sson the CDR have been experienced only 
for a few decades. 
5. From 〔3)and (4) we田nconclude that in advanced countries 
dunng their iridustriahzation both CBRs and CDRs declmed con-
stantly at similar rates, while in LDCs from 1910 to the pr田ent
. Fig. 3 allcf4 : Birth Rates and Death Rates, 
Advanced and Developing Countries 
Pod.GOO 
Pop•lotion Adrnnood Co . fri" 
Pod,000 
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40 
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only the CDRs declined followed by unchanged CBRs yielding 
population growth rates which explain the current population 
“explosion". Compare figures 3 and 4. 
6. The discrepancy between the two population patterns widens 
when we open the closed model to allow for effects of migration. 
In 18 th and 19 th c四 turyEurope migration on a large scale was 
possible, and had its favorable effects on economic development. 
Emigration-either to "new”continents or withm Europe-mitigated 
a drop in the p町田pitaincomes in the densely populated 町田S
and stimulated economic development in sparsely populated 町田s.
(7) Immigration, quite in contrast to LDCs today, was frequently 
used in田 rlyEurope as a tool of economic凹Hcy. Frederick the 
Gr田t,e.g , attracted m叩 yworkers to Prussia in the period of 
r配：onstruct10nafter the Seven Years War (8〕Althoughthe pr田sure
from population in LDCs today is conside悶blyhigher than it was 
in 18 th and 19出 centuryEurope, the LDCs today have no similar 
effective migration mechanism which would release some of the 
pressure of their population growth 
II. The growth of total and per capita incomes 
1. We know from the relationship (see Appendix Section 4) 
r， ~r,-rp 
that a percentage incr由民 inpopulation is linearly related to a 
decrease in the per capita income. Since we回 nconclude from the 
previous section that the population growth rates m the European 
countries in the 18th and 19th century were considerably lower 
than the population growth rat田 oftbe LDCs today, it follows that 
the pressure of the population growth on the per capita mcomes is 
higher m the LDCs today than it was for the European count口田
at the time when they underwent mdustrializat10n目
Nevertheless, despite this burden from the population growth, 
the p町田pitagrowth rates in most of the LDCs, particularly in 
some of the ECAFE countries, compare very favorably with the 
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growth rates of various European countries at the time when their 
p町田pitamcome was on a similar level 
2. Since 
r， ~r。＋r,,
this is nee田sarilydue to the fact that the growth四teof the total 
product was considerably lower in the presently mdustnahzed 
countn田 inthe early stages of their development than 1t is in the 
LDCs today. In the United Kingdom the growth rate of the GNP 
between 1790 and 1820 was in ave四ge2%, in Germany between 
1850 and 1880, 2. 7%; in the USA between 1820 and 1850, about 
4%, and in Japan between 1875 and 1900, about 4%. In comparison 
to the GNP growth performance of this country group the LDCs 
today increased their total GNP between 1950 and 1967 by an 
annual average of 4: 8%. (9). Particularly succ田sfulwere some of 
the Asian countries. Of the nine countries hsted m the ECAFE 
statistic below the perfo口nanceof seven exceeded the 6. 0% growth 
target of the Second Development De田dein 1970, and the weighted 
average for the countries of the table was 6. 1 % (10) 
IV. The economic impact of absolute changes in population 
1 If the economic・ growth rates of the LDCs today compare fav・ 
orably with the economic growth rates of the European countries 
in their early stag.田 ofeconomic development, what then is the 
development problem of the LDCs today? Why were the European 
countries not confronted to・ the same extent with economic develop・ 
m田tproblems as compared to most of the LDCs today> Indeed, 
the economic development problem of contemporary LDCs hes・ not 
in the relative changes per se, but rather in the absolute size at 
which these changes take place. In the followmg, first, the pattern 
of the absolute growth of population will be briefly described 
pointmg out its relevance for the length ofthe time periods applied. 
In the subsequent section the economic implications of high absolute 
changes of population which emerge from the fact that the supply 
Ta
bl
e 
6
:
 S
el
ec
te
d 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
in
 
th
e 
E
C
A
F
E
 
re
ki
on
. 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 r
at
es
 
of
 
G
N
P
 ~t
 c
on
st
an
t 
pr
ic
es
 
1
9
6
0
-
1
9
7
1
 
G
D
P
 'p
ro
je
ct
ed
 
G
N
P
 1
96
7 
An
nu
al
 c
om
po
un
d 
Ch
an
ge
s 
fr
om
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
ye
ar
 
gr
ow
th
 ~；
~~ 
(b
il
li
on
 
ra
te
s 
(p
er
 
ce
nt
) 
b
 (p
er
 7~'
1,nt
) 
19
70
-1
9 
U
S
$
)
 
19
60
-
19
65
-
19
68
 
19
69
 
19
 
19
71
 c
 
19
72
 
19
70
 
19
70
 
ln
di
au
 
5
.
5
-
6.
5 
46
.0
 
3.
8 
4.
4 
3.
1 
5.
3 
5.
3 
4.
8 
4.
0 
i~~
~~c
sia
 
11
.0
 
3.
3 
4・
.7
 
6.
6 
6.
5 
6.
3 
6.
9 
7.
0 
8.
0-
10
.0
 
7.
4 
7.
9 
9.
2 
7.
9 
11
.1
 
8.
6 
10
.3
 
14
.0
 
Ko
re
a,
 R
ep
，。
f
8.
0-
10
.0
 
4.
8 
9.
2 
12
.0
 
13
.3
 
15
.9
 
8.
9 
9.
8 
7
 .5 
Ma
la
ys
i~
0 W
es
t 
6
.
5
-
6.
5 
2.
9 
6.
3 
6.
9 
4.
9 
8.
0 
6.
1 
4.
1 
4.
0 
Pa
ki
st
a 
6
.
0
-
7
 0
 
10
.8
 
5.
4 
5.
5 
8.
2 
4.
4 
6.
6 
1.
<l
 
5.
0 
Ph
il
ip
pt
ne
s 
6
.
0
-
7
 .0
 
6.
2 
5. 
7
 
6.
3 
6.
2 
6.
7 
6.
2 
5.
5 
5
目
5
Sr
i 
La
nk
a 
4
.
5
-
5.
5 
1.
9 
4.
5 
5.
1 
8.
4 
4.
7 
4.
1 
0.
9 
3.
0 
Th
ai
la
nd
 
8
.
0
-
8.
5 
4.
2 
7
目
9
8.
5 
8.
6 
7
目
4
6.
7 
6.
1 
4.
5 
We
ig
ht
ed
 a
ve
ra
ge
 
6.
1ー
7.
2
4.
9 
5. 
7
 
5.
6 
6.
5 
6.
1 
5.
6 
5.
5 
So
ur
ce
. 
Ec
on
om
ic
 S
ur
ve
y 
of
 
As
ia
 a
nd
 t
l;
e 
.F
ar
 
Ea
st
, 
19
71
. 
a
 T
he
se
 p
ro
je
ct
io
ns
 
ar
e 
co
nt
at
ne
d 
in
 
tw
o 
E
C
A
F
E
 d
oc
um
en
ts
, 
Fe
as
ib
le
 G
ro
wt
h 
an
d 
Tr
ad
e 
Ga
p 
Pr
nj
ec
-
ti
on
s 
in
 
th
e 
De
ve
lo
pi
ng
 E
C
A
F
E
 R
eg
io
n,
 
De
ve
lo
pi
ng
 P
r
o
g
r
n
m
m
m
g
 T
ec
hn
iq
ue
s 
Se
ri
es
 N
o.
 7,
 
an
d 
Se
ct
or
al
 
Ou
tp
ut
 a
nd
 E
mp
lo
ym
en
t 
Pr
oj
ec
ti
on
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
Se
.c
on
d 
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
De
ca
de
, 
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
Pr
og
ra
mm
in
g 
Te
ch
ni
qu
e 
~e
ri
es
 N
o.
 8.
 
b
 D
er
iv
ed
 f
ro
m 
na
ti
on
al
 
of
fi
c.
ia
l 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
ns
. 
c
 E
st
im
at
es
 f
ro
m 
na
t1
0n
al
 o
ff
ic
ia
l 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
ns
. 
d
 Y
ea
r・
en
dt
ng
20
 M
ar
ch
. 
e
 Y
ea
r 
en
di
ng
 3
1 
Ma
rc
h.
 A
 s
mt
ab
lc
 a
dj
us
tm
en
t 
ha
s 
be
en
 m
ad
e 
fo
r 
Pa
ki
st
an
 i
n 
ob
ta
im
ng
 t
he
 r
eg
io
na
l 
we
ig
ht
ed
 a
ve
ra
ge
 f
or
 1
97
1 
an
d 
19
72
 
8: 
56 
of land is constant are discussed. 
2. We田nwrite for the absolute rate of population, assuming 
ideal cond1t1ons, that is to say, food and shelter is abundantly 
available for additional p田ple,
dP _ dP _ 
1τα＂＂ dt t' 
We car 1柁 thed蜘 er
dP p~cdt 
and integrate this differential 
dP マp-=cdt
or lnP=ct+k 
We take e and raise it to the powers on both sides of the equation 
and we get 
P=ect+k=e".ek=Kect 
In the exponential growth path, 
P=Kect 
K represents the initial population at the time when t＝仏 cis a 
constant which depends on economic, cultural and inst!tut10nal fac-
tors, and t stands for time 
3 From the preceding section two important conclusions can be 
drawn・ (a) the size of the absolute rate of change depends on the 
size of the imtial absolute value，〔b)a constant absolute rate of 
change is accomplished m an increasingly shorter time period. 
dP 
(a〕Fromthe differential equationdt=cP we see that the bigger 
the population, the bigger the absolute growth rate. The size of 
the increase in the absolute rate of change is described by the 
powerful exponential trends expressed m the relationship 
P=Kect 
Hence, when we make a graph of the population with r田pectto 
time t for both European countries at the time of their early 
industrializat10n and the LDCs, agam particularly the Asian coun-
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tries, we see that smce Europe started with a smaller population, 
the slope of its graph (and therefore i桔 rateof ascent〕issmaller 
than Asia's. (See figure 5). This trend is, furthermore, much 
aggravated by the incr，曲目 overtime in c in the LDCs as described 
in paragraph I 
(b) The relationship betw田ntime, the initial population, and the 
absolute change in population can be expressed by the differential 
notion 
dP=cPdt 
Let us assume now for the sake of simplicity that the constant c 
Fig 5 : Population of Ecafe Region and Europe 
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for the 18th町id19 th century Europ田ncountries田idthe LDCs 
today is the same. Since the absolute population P of today’s LDC 
is much larger than early Europe's we see that m order to produce 
阻 equalsmall change in population dP in LDCs today we need a 
much smaller change m time dt than in early Europe If we write 
P,1 for the population of LDCs, and PE for the population of Europe 
including North America and Australia, than we田nwrite 
cPE dtE~cP A dtA 
dtA~~ιdtE・
工A
4. The economic consequences of an exponential trend of populat10n 
become clear if we consider the fact that land which supports the 
additional population remains constant. Denoting the ratio by 
r~＊ 
where N stands for land, we see that r being the ratio of N to P 
s。onbecomes very small (even though N is large) if P increases 
exponentially Since we saw in the ab。veanalysis that PA i s
incr回 si
and decreases rapidly further as time goes. If we write for the 
two ratios 
NA 
rA＝子工
回 d四＝普
we田nexpress the ratio of the man-land ratios of Europe and the 
LDCs as 
? ?
?
??
? ? ?
??
五加世io長 isdecr田sing－~ b叫 aconstant it follows 
出 tthe四tioof白 twoland-man四ti由 f士山 isdecreasi唱
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Therefore, the conclus10n made with regard to the exponential 
trend of the populations are-mutatis mutand1s-vahd for change 
m the land-man-ratio detenorates much more rapidly m LDCs 
today than 1t did m Europe. Similarly, the size of the absolute 
changes m population in a given time period is relatively larger m 
LDCs today than it was in Europe, and, therefore, the land-man-
rat10 deteriorates to a g自民rextent in the LDCs today th叩 it
did in Europe w1thm an equivalent time period. 
Economically speaking, we田nnot say that a decrease iri the 
ratio per se is economically detrimental. Alr田 dy200 Y＜曲目 ago.
the classical economists, like ADAM SMITH, JOHN STUART 
MILL, and ROBERT MALTHUS explained that an incr団関 in.
population, or of. labor employed on the land respectively, can have 
positive effects Cm an early stage of product10n) or negative effects 
(in later stages of production) on the output denved from the 
land The decisive pomt, therefore, is . Where are we located on. 
the curve of return from land 7 Posmg this question, we arrive aL 
very different answers for Europe and LDCs Let us first bnefly 
sketch the situat10n th回目ticaly,and then plot the two empirical 
cases on a hypothetical line. 
5 Given a fixed quantity of land, the output of the land is a. 
f回目tionf of the population L livmg on the land and the technology 
applied, e. g , 
O=f(N, L, T) 
where N is the quantity of land being fixed, L is labor engaged m 
agnculture being roughly proportio田 teto population, and T is 
technology. The empirical law is stated as follows: If the onginal 
population is small then the growth of output with r田pectto 
growth of labor starts to increase m a concave upward way, e目g.
the second derivative f”＞。（A-phase). As the labor population 
grows and the land mass remains constant we soon reach a point 
of in畳ect10nwhere f”＝0 (end of A-phase〕.As the labor populat10n 
continues to grow, we are in a concave downward situation, and 
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the output stil grows but with a smaller increase, that 1s to say, 
the second derivative f”＜o CB-phase). We soon reach the pomt 
-0f maximum output that the land can sustain and at this pomt the 
xate of growth ＝札 orthe first derivative f' ~o (end of B-phase〕
U the population continues to grow the output will decrease (C, 
phase〕.(See figure 6) . 
.Fig 6 : Hypothetical ¥otal Return Curve of the. Agricultural Sector 
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喧. Empin回levid田 cesupports the thesis that Europe at the time 
of its early industrialization was m the A-phase rather than in the 
B-phase while the LDCs today are m the B・phase or n田rthe 
turning point to the C-phase rather than in・ the A-phase. The 
empirical verification of this thesis田nbe es ta bhshed on two 
grounds: (a〕smcethe location of the empirical points on the output 
-curve depends on the land man-ratio, the empirical arguments can 
be derived from the land-man-ratio ；〔b〕thechanges m the relative 
:increase in the agricultural output allow conclusions with regard to 
the location on the agricultural return curve. 
(a) the favorable land-man-ratio in early Europe is demonstrated 
by the fact that land cl田 raneeas a 四回国 of enhancement of 
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agricultural output was f田 s1ble. This is particularly true .for 
Eastern Europe where most 町田sdid not reach田turation,so far 
as population was concerned, until late in the 19th century. Only 
smce the begmning of the pr・自由tcentury land clearance has ceased 
to be of ma1or importance, and a further mcrease in agricultural 
population has therefore meant a diminishing amount of land per 
m田 workingm agriculture〔11〕.In Western Europe there were signs 
of overpopulation considering the prevailing technological and in-
stitutional conditions in the 19th century. 
However, the extensive method of land cultivat10n which was 
characteristic of a low-technology agriculture offered large reserve-
capacities for future incr田 sesm agricultural output as soon as 
adequate technology could be applied (particularly the use of 
fertilizers). In France, England and Saxony, e.g., in 1760 half of 
the land cultivated had to be sacrificed as fallow land under the 
two-field system. With the subsequent change to the three-and 
four field system the percentage of fallow land constantly fel over 
the following 150 Y•田rs enabling a better land-man-ratio 〔land
defmed here as permanently cultivated land〕 CompareTable 6. 
In East-Elbian Prussia from 1815 to 1864 the 町田 undercultiva-
tion more than doubled, from 5 5 to12 m1lhon hectars, while in 
Table 7 : 'Percentage of arable land used as fallow land 
France England Saxony 
% of %。t %。t
Period fallow Period fallow Period falo¥v 
land land land 
1760 50 % 1812 20 % 1657 38 % 
1790 40 9五 1831 .14% ユ713 32 % 
1840 27 % 1866 6% ユ760 34 % 
1852 20 % 1891 3% ユ800 3% 
1892 13 % 
Source: Bairoch, Paul, Le role de l'a.griculture dans la creation de la 
Siderurgie moderne; in:Revue d’hist01re economique et social, 1966, No.1. 
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Posen the share of arable land rose m the same time span from 
1. 9% to 60. 6%, and in Pomerania from 15. 5% to 52. 3% of the 
total land 町田（12〕．
There are few similar r田町V田 ofvirgm lands or extensively 
cultivated lands in LDCs today. According to COLIN CLARK the 
supply of land per male engaged m agnculture in the past World 
War I y回目 isonly 0. 057 square kilometers in AsiaUapan 0. 042), 
0. 3 square kilometers for Africa, and. 0 7 square kilometers for 
Latin America. In North America and Australasia the supply of 
land per male engaged in・agriculture is for the same time period 
1. 61 square kilometers, and in non-communist E町'Ope0. 069 square 
kilometers(13) To put the problem of the low land-man-ratio in 
LDCs in the proper. perspective we have to consider the fact that 
the climate and quality of soil does usually not allow the cultivat10n 
of virgm land. A quater of a century ago .MOHR pomted out that 
it was no mere accident that Java had about 60 million people on 
30 million acres wher・回 sBorneo, with four times more acres, 
supported only 3 million people. 75% of the soil of Java consists of 
base-rich andestitic lavas or of colluvial and alluvial deposits denved 
from such Javas, whereas Borneo’s soil consists of older sedimentary 
rocks which・ are base deficient and mherently mfertile. An agric-
ultural potentialsimilar ta Borneo’s can be found over much of the 
Amazon. and Congo basms and other smaller 町田sin the humid 
tropi白.（4)
〔b)As a result of the relatively favorable land-man ratio during 
the past 200 y回目 inEurope the agricultural output mcreased 
considerably when the percentage of fallow land decreased, addit10nal 
technology was applied and the necess町ymstitutional changes were 
achieved. C'Ompare; e. g. the extension of 町田sunder cultivation 
for Prussia mentioned in the last paragraph with its respective 
incr・掛田 inagncultural outputs. (Table 7) 
Carisidering the unfavorable land-man-ratio in LDCs one is apt 
to expect slowly increasing, constant, or even decreasing returns in 
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Table 8 : Prussia (1815 boundaries) : Outp~t of Field Crops 
(in 10,000 tons) 
Cereals 
Potatoes 
Beets, turnips, and other roots 
Animal fodder 
1816 
508.8 
93.。
1864 
l, 097. 8 
1,135.2 
1, 090. 0 
356.1 
Source: H W. Finck von Finckenstem, Die Entwicklung der Landwirt= 
schaft in Preussen and Deutschland 1800-1930, Wtirzburg, p.'326; quoted 
in: Landes, D, Japan and Europe: Contrasts in Industrialization, 'Loock= • 
wood, s・tate and Enterprise in Japan, op. cit., p 162. 
agricultural output per additional labor engaged in agricultural 
activities, -In reality, this 1s only partly the case.τhe mcrease in 
agricultural output is in some 町田Sconside阻ble. The average 
annual rate of growth in agricultural' output between 1960 and 1966 
was for .al LDCs 2. 1 %, for Africa 1. 4%, South Asia 0. 6%, East 
Asia旦2%,Southern Europe 3. 7%, Latin America 2. 9%, and Middle 
East 4. 1 % The mdustnahzed countri田 averagedin the same span 
an average annual rate of growth in their agricultural production 
of 1. 8%. (15) In the F;CAFE countri田 theaverage weighted rate of 
growth of agricultural output dunng the First Development Decade 
was 2 8% The decade ended at皿 evensubstantially higher growth 
level, since the “Green Revolution" liad a strong impact on the 
growth performance of important field crops. (16) 
7 However, the seemingly satisfactory output performance of the 
LDCs has to be viewed in the light of the proportions of the input 
factors in the production and the capacity to change the input mix 
of the production function over a long period of time It is evident 
from the preceding discuss10n that m Europe increases m agncultu四l
output could be achieved to a considerable extent by inct・田sing・the 
supply of cultivated land, while ・in LDCs today a similar increase 
in agricultural output can be only achieved by mcreasing the mputs 
in labor and, particularly, technology目 Inother words, while Europe 
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Table 9 ECAFE reg10n: ・Rates of growth by country in 
agricultural output and food production (total and per 
capita), between 1959-1961 to 1969 1971 
ECAFE 
Agricultural Food Food production 
production production (per capita) 
a) Developing 2. 8 2.6 0.1 
countries 
b) Selected 
countries 
Afghanistan 1.2 1.1 -1.2 
Burma 2.1 2.0 
India 2.2 2.2 -0.2 
Indonesia 2.1 2.2 -0.3 
Iran 3.0 2.8 
Korea, Republic of 4. 5 4.0 1. 3 
Malaysia, West 5.7 5.5 2.4 
Pakistan 3. 3 3.2 0.1 
Philippines 3.2 3.2 
Sri Lanka 2.9 3.8・ 1. 0 
Thailand 5.2 5.2 2.5 
Souroe: Ecafe, Econo皿.leSpryey, Part One, To主yo,1972, 
p 91/92. 
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possessed reserv田 intechnology which were not necessanly fully 
utilized in order to mcr田seagricultural output, the LDCs today 
rely almost solely on the production factor of technology and fer-
tilizer practices when they wish to accomplish a simiiar increase in 
their agncultural ・output. This has grave long-run effects on the 
agricultural output, because the production factor of technology 
seems to obey a similar “law of decreasing returns”as does the 
production factor labor. Therefore, though technology lifts the 
return curve over a long time span constantly upwards, and enables 
a situation m which the return curve over a long time span suc-
cessfully回目P田 themaximum point where agricultural output 
stagnates, the potential long四 nadditional output in LDCs today is 
to be expected likely to be smaller than it was over the 、last.200 
y団四 inEurope. The long run production function can be <iescnbed 
as ari aggregate of the “traditional”production functions, .where the 
shape of the “aggregate”curve is determmed by technology “pushes.” 
監InfJ吾ure7, k depicts .the long-run output or 0'.curve , -the dotted 
line connects the maximum pmnts of 0-curves. The X line depicts the 
subsistence level of population P C md1cates the actual consumption 
level of the populat10n Pas dete口nrnedby 0-curves; C1 the consumption 
level of which the population P, is supported at subsistence”level X,; 
.c, a consumption level where most people s恒rveand some die (assum -
1培 C=O, e g., no food imports). Y, is the gap between the 
subsistence level, X，副1dthe actual level of consumption below 
subsistence, C，・x*indicates the “absolute”subsistence level assuming 
士he0-curve回 nnotbe further pushed upwards by technology. At 
x. the “maximum”population P＊回nbe supported Beyond x. a 
Jong-run gap Yn develops, at X, a population P, suffers from a 
gap y，・
Followmg our emp1口四ldiscussion we assume that the LDCs today, 
particularly the Asian countnes, are much nearer the point of 
absolute population P* and the paint of absolute total subsistence 
level x., than the European countnes were during the time of 
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Fig 7 : Hypothetical long-run Aggregate Return Curve 
of.the Agricultural Sector and Food Consumption 
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their economic development process. European countries could have-
moved over a long・time pe口odon the slope of the “traditional” 
return curves, immediately without lifting the return curves 
upwards, while LDCs today constantly must produce near the 
maximum points, and an additional agricultu悶loutput only can be 
accomplished by pushing the “traditional'”return curves with the 
help of input “pushes”of technology upwards. Whether such 
technological achievements四nbe accomplished m LDCs withm the・ 
next decades is stil open to debate. It might well be that the・ 
application of technology was more favorable in Europe than it is 
today in LDCs , not only due to the different loca土ionon the ‘＇ag・ 
gregate”long・run return curve but also due to various different 
institutional and cultural factors. The long run return curve might 
have, therefore, shifted up faster in Europe during the last 20・ 
years than it will in the next decades in LDCs. If this projection 
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is true and it will prove to be true 1f achievements hke the “Green 
Revolution，，国nnotbe repeated-the point of the absolute subsistence 
level Xキ atwhich an absolute maximum population P •：国n be 
supported will be reached in LDCs at a point when Europe was in 
the middle of its development process. Such a constellation would 
have severe repercussions on the developm田 tprocess of these 
countries, since the productivity performance of the agricultural 
sector is related to the performance of vanous other economic key 
variables as will be shown in the following chapter. 
V. The impact of agricultural productivity on other key 
variables of economic development 
The impact of changes of agricultural productivity on the devel-
・opment proc田sin Europe and the LDCs田nbe adequately described 
witb a model which relates agricultural productivity to some of the 
.economic key variables over a long penod of time. In domg so I 
follow the, model by RANIS/FEI which is based on the experience 
.of the long-run economic development process of Europe (17) The 
mam thesis of the model is that the extension of the agricultural 
productivity hes at the heart of the Europ田neconomic progress, 
and that the telescoping of this experience m the contemporary 
LDCs is feasible. 
According to RANIS/FEI Europe’s long-run growth process fol 
lowed a sequence of three major “epochs” Ca〕”SimpleAgrarian-
1sm，＇’〔b〕“MercantileAgrarianism”， and (c）“Industrial Capital-
ism.” 
(a〕Theepoch of“Simple Ag四r1an1sm”，国nbe identified by the 
dominance of the agricultural production to the exclusion of other 
forms of economic activity. The capital stock repr時間tsonly a 
“wages fund" used for bridging the gap which aris田 fromthe 
non-coincidence of production and consumption periods. Therefore, 
m the epoch of“Simple Agrariamsm”the capital stock (K〕is
proportional to the population (P), where the proportionality factor 
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in K~OP is positively related to the “degree”。fdivergence between・ 
the production and consumption periods. Similarly, the mvestment 
per h田 d(I/P) must be in proportion to the populat10n growth 
rate, r, with the same proportionality factor 
~ dK 
-i.－~ dt ~Orv 
• p 
(b) The epoch of“Mercantile Agranamsm”is characterized by 
the increasmg impact of mercantile activities. What distinguishes 
“Simple Agrarianism”from “Mercantile Agranamsm”is a newly 
erected mfrastructure pertinent to trade activities spread over a 
wide geographi国larea. Total agricultural output (0〕isin the 
“Mercantile Agranamsm”divided into three parts : consumption 
(C〕， investmentin the “wag.田 fund”（I〕， and,mvestment m com・ 
mercial四p1tal(I’） K’is proportional to the volume of trade (T〕，
i. e, K’~O'T, being a function of the per国間ta“trademargm” 
(q) and P, T~P,·' is approximated by q ~p c where p is the 
average labor productivity and c the per capita consumption of self 
cons lmed goods 
Then k’~O'P(p-c〕
and for per capita investment m commercial capital 
n 
-p-=O'(p-c〕
Including the demand for capital for the “wages fund" the total 
investment per head required becomes 
n 
-j,-=(O+O’（p-c))rv 
From this formula we see that in the “Mercantile Agrarianism”， 
growth is, first, population pulled as in the田町 of"Simple Agra -
rianism，” and, secondly, determmed by the size of the agricultural 
trade margin 
(c) The epoch of “Industrial Capitalism”is characterized by the 
establishment of a new form economic dualism between agricultural 
and industrial production activities. The ‘＇Industrial Capitalism" 
grew out of the “Mercantile Agrarianism”whose productivity 
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performance allowed the reallocat10n of labor for industrial activities 
and the channelmg of agricultu四lsurplus as fixed capital m the 
industrial sector 
2. Before going mto the empirical question of the model, a few 
comments on the theoretical nature of the model should be made. 
First, in the th白 reticalconcept presented the per capita investm田 t
is equally dependent on the volume of the per capita trade margin, 
q, and the population growth rate, rp. An mcrease in the per目別ta
investment for commercial capital can be achieved either by an 
increase of q, or of r., or of both, q, and rp. Therefore, we might 
conclude that 1t is necessarily favorable for the incr自民 ofthe 
volume of the per capita investment to have an increase in rp. 
This is misleading. Any change in rp has repercussions on the 
productivity and the p町四pitaoutput. These repercussrnns can 
as the preceding discussion revealed-be either favorable, as in the 
case of Europe, or unfavorable as m the case of most of the LDCs. 
Population growth can as in the case of Europe, exert a stimulatmg 
“pull”－effect on investment and growth; it can exert as well a 
depressing effect if the per capita trade margin drops because the 
increases in the productivity of the agricultural sector drop due to 
population pr田surethis being the case in most of the LDCs. 
Secondly, the capita trade margms q，・恥 aresuggested to be of 
equal quality if p and c of the trade margins yield the same diff 
erance, e. g. 
p,-c, ~p，ーc,
q， ~q, 
Thus, given the population P, the volume of trade and its 
stimulating effect on economic growth are the same m, e. g., q, 
and q2. In a dynamic view, however, the “quality”of q, as 
expressed by the absolute values of p and c, is as crucial a deter-
minant as the mere volume of q. This decisive development aspect 
cannot be adequately dealt with in a formula which includes only 
a proport10nality factor In order to include the long-run growth 
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potential as well as the potential to accomplish the transition from 
one epoch to another we have, furthermore, to include 
(a) the location of p on the long-run agricultu四lreturn curve, 
(b) the location of c on the long-run curve of mcome elasticities 
of demand for food and agricultural products. 
RAINS/FEl refine their model by introducing a productivity coef ・ 
ficient which defmes the increase m agricultural productivity as 
being proportional to the change in the commercial capital stock 
per head, 
dp I CiC~ip 
This certainly describes a true and impo此antrelationship. However, 
it does not provide any information on how the growth process 
took place, e. g , inEurope, or, how 1t will take place, e. g., in the 
LDCs. Applymg the above relationship the growth of p田nbe 
constant, decr田sing,or incr国 smgdue to the sp回 f1clocation on 
the long-run retu口1curve, as expressed, e g , bychanges m the 
capital・output-ratio. It can be hampered by an mcreasing c, or, it 
can be supported by a decreasmg c The direction of the growth 
path is open; i does not describe q which determmes the change 
in the commeてcialcapital stock. The following discussion shall 
shed some ligbt on the empirical long run behavior of q,p, and c 
during the development process of the European countries in the 
18th and 19 tb century and the LDCs today. The outcome of this 
disussion will allow us to draw some conclusions about the impact 
of the changes m q (as a result of changes in p and c〕onthe 
economic development process of the respective country groups. 
3. When analysing the empirical shape of the long-run trends of 
p and c, two questions are of particular interest ・ (i) What is a 
th即日ti白 lyplausible pattern of the long run (a〕p・curve,(b〕c・
curve? (i) Where on these two curves is p and c located at certain 
levels of the p町田pitaincome? 
(a〕pcurve: 
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(i〕It白nbe concluded from the preceding discussion that the 
growth of the agricultural output increases m the first mstance as 
variable inputs labor and technology are added to the fixed amount 
of land (A-phase), that the growth of the agricultural output 
starts decreasing and stagnating when an unfavorable land-man-
ratio is being reached (B-phase), and that the agricultural output 
will even declme m absolute terms if an increase of inputs (due to 
a growing agricultiural labor population〕isdetrimental to the 
efficiency of the production. 
(n〕Asfor the specific empirical locations, it can be cοncluded 
that the LDCs today are nearer the long-run maximum point on 
the agricultural output curve than the Europ田ncountries durmg 
their mdustnalization phase. Considering the lower absolute values 
of the per capita output in LDCs today the absolute changes in the 
agricultural per capita output will be lower m LDCs even if the 
relative changes can be kept as high as they were in the 18th and 
19th century in Europe. Both the fact that in LDCs the agricul-
tural per capita output is very low in absolute terms, and the fact 
that the position of the per capita output on the a耳目culturalretu口3
curve is unfavo目bleis decisive for the changes jn q of the LDCs. 
(b〕c-curve:
Two th回目ticalgeneralizations shall be made . First, the lower 
the per capita income the higber the income elasticity of demand 
for food, or, the higher the p町田pitaincome the lower the mcome 
elasticity of demand for food Secondly, the changes can be broadly 
classified mto three phases. In the first phase (X-phase), wh田
the per capita mcome is low田t,an increase in the per capita 
income will induce a higher consumption m non-agricultural田 S印－
tials than in food. In the second phase (Y-phase), when also the 
non-agricultural consumption reached some kmd of subsistance 
level, an mcr田 sein the per capita income goes into food consump-
tion establishing a constant or slowly decreasing mcome elasticity 
of demand for food. In the third phase 〔Z-phase〕theshare of 
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non-agricultural products on the total consumption incr，曲目ssucc-
自由vely,that is, the income elasticity of demand for food decreases 
successively. These g四 eralizationsapply to both urban and rural 
populations, although there are deviat10ns in degree 
Besides the relative char宮崎 theabsolute values of the per capita 
food consumption are important. The absolute values of the per 
回pitafood consumption can be derived from (aa) the absolute 
level of the total p町田pitaconsumption, (bb) the share of the 
p町田pitafood consumption on the total per capita consumption. 
The absolute level of the per capita consumption is positively 
related to the p町田pitaincome , therefore, conclusions about the 
per capita income are-mutatis mutandis equally true for the level 
of the total per田 pitaconsumption. 
(i) Before analysing c and q the long-run trend of the aggregate 
value p町田pitatotal consumption of food shall he analysed Recall 
the conclusion that the levels of per capita income in the European 
countries at the time before their industrial財団kthroughwas 
considerably higher than the levels of the per capita income in the 
LDCs today. Since the proportions of the personal savmgs increased 
from about 18日0to about 1900 only from about 3% to about 10%, 
the preponderant part of the mcrease in disposable mcome (which 
rose about 3 to 4. 5 tim田 theimtial level〕wentinto mcre回目 in
consumption(18). The share of the per capita food consumption on 
the per capita total consumption follows in the long run the pattern 
as described m the precedmg theoretical generalizat10n m terms 
of changes in income elasticity. The share of food m total consump-
tion expenditures declined, i. e., in Germany from 44 8% in 1815-
1870 to, 39. 9% in 1871-1890, and to 38. 5% in 1891-1910, in the 
United States from 39. 2% in 1886-1908 to 31. 0% in 1909 1928, in 
Sweden from an ave四geof 36. 3% in 1864，’73，’82 to 28. 2% in 
1938 1948 However, the picture also has some features which 
diverge from this trend. In the United Kingdom and Italy no 
signifi臼.ntdrop in the share of food in the to旬Iconsumption can 
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be observed before the post World War I decade. Even in the-
countries mentioned, where the Jong-run trend on the whole 1s. 
downward, there are Jong periods in which the share fails to decline-
although per capita incomes rise at marked rates. In Germany 
between 1871-1910, m Sweden between 1864-1926, in Canada between 
1900-1910 and 1941-1950 the share of food hardly changed. One-
might speak of a dominance of the Y-phase, and a reluctance of 
the Y-phase to turn to the Z-phase over almost a whole country. 
This result is the more surprising if we co田 iderthe conclus10n; 
from the preceding discussion that total consumption expend1tur田，
kept pace with the rise in disposable per capita food eonsumptio:O., 
was proportionate the incr田 sein the disposable per capita income .
If European experi田iceteaches us a lesson; it is the followmg : 
the income elasticities of demand for food decrease in the long run 
as described in text books. This decreaseョhowever,is much more・ 
reluctantly accomplished than is usually assumed. It was the-
Y -phase, rather than the constantly declining income elasticities of 
the Z-phase, which gave European development m the 19th century 
its feature. 
Can we conclude per analogiam from the European experience to・ 
the contemporary development process in LDCs 7 Cross country 
comparisons r師団lthat the share of the per capita food consump-
tion on the total per capita consumption decreases as the disposable・ 
per capita incr田 S田. At a level of $ 100 the respective share is 
5. 0%, at S 100 200 45. 8% at $ 200-300 37. 6%, at $ 350 575 36. 1 % 
(19). The decline in the share of per回pitafood consumption on 
the total per capita consumption is accomplished faster in LDCs. 
today than it was accomplished in Europe m the 19th century. We-
might expect that the Y -phase, establishing a relatively constant 
share of the per capita food consumption, is not reached in LDCs 
today ; in fact, this is the田町. Since the per capita incomes m 
LDCs are considerably lower than they were on the ave回gemthe-
19 th century m Europe, the rapid decline in the food share can be 
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explained by the pent-up demand with regard to other urgently 
needed goods. Once the saturation of the basic needs for non-food 
products is r田 ched,the share of the food consumption is hkely to 
<lecrease slower than it did in the initial stage when per capita incomes 
were at their lowest. Empin回ldata confirm such a retardation in 
the decline of the share of the food consumpt10n on total consumption 
While the respective decline in LDCs with a per capita income 
between under $ 100 and S 2C日－S350 is 17. 4%, the decline in 
-・countn田 witha p町田.pitamcome of S 200 $ 350 and S 575 $ 1000 
is only 7 1%.(20〕Asimilar conclus10n白nbe derived from a com-
parison of the mcome elasticities of demand for calorie consumption 
1n countries with different levels of per capita income. While the 
difference in the income elasticities betwe四， eg., India with a 
level of p町田pitaincome of $ 69 (1958) and Portugョlwith a level 
・of per回pitamcome of S 248〔1958) amounted to 0. 43 m the coe-
fficient of elasticity, the difference in the coefficient of elasticity 
between Portugal or other countries with a similar level of per 
capita income and the rest of the countries hsted in table 9 with a 
level of p町田pitaincome between S 248-S 370 hardly changed (21〕．
We have, however, to recall the fact that the absolute values of 
the share might be considerably higher at a high level of per 
・capita income although the relative share or the changes in the 
relative share are smaller at a high level of per capita income 
4. The mcr田sesin the absolute levels of the total food consump-
tion per capita田nbe channeled either in c or q. ・In order to 
analyse the distribution pattern of the per capita total food con-
sumption we have to analyse the factors underlying the channeling 
of p. Excluding for the moment imports (M) and exports (X) the 
per回 pitafood consumption of the urban population 〔Cu〕equalsq, 
q=c. 
The四回cityto produce q does not depend on the same factors 
as the demand for q, c.. The capacity to produce over time an 
incr田sedq depends-considering only c-on the absolute level of 
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Table 10 : Internat10nal Comparison of Income Elasticities for-
Calorie Consu回ption"'
Income 
elast>eity 
Per capita 
national income 
(1958 US Dollars) 
Japan, 1878 82 to 1923-27 
Simple per capita 
Per consumption unit 
Time series, 1950-1958 
India 
Taiwan 
Philippines 
Ceylon 
Brad! 
Turkey 
Poctugal 
Gcoece 
Mexico 
Spain 
Japan 
International cross sections 
Hayami・ Yamada 
all countries 
less than NI $300 
Jureen' 
Ohkawa' 
0 18 
0.19 
0. 64 
0.33 
0.44 
0.49 
0.29 
0.18 
0.21 
0. 12 
0.30 
0.23 
0.20 
??????? ? ??
122 (218)0 
69' 
90' 
1131 
1161 
1261 
2451 
2481 
2871 
317' 
3311 
3701 
650' 
1731 
125 
420 
Some *Tho coclfioi'"t of moomc ela.tic.ty "timato f。r"""・ 1878-
1882 to 1923-1927 hmd '" !he mfocm"i'" oollocted by the acthm 
T•m• Scci" 1950-1958 dot" fr。mFAO, Agnccllml Commodi<;" Pmccl・ 
ion Jar 1970 (1962), Amcx 師 Method~， A 14-15. 
Haym Yamada fotccnotional ""' """"' "timat" hmd '" data colic 
cted by the '"thoc;. 
Jureen internati。no!m" mtioo o;timatc from Lac. Jmeo，“Long teem 
Tmd; m Food Commptioo A Mclti c。cotcyStcdy," Emamctnoo. 
五五IV(Jn.. 1956), p. 1-21. 
Ohkawa’＇ mtmati。oalcc。＂;cctwn "timate from K Ohkawa，“Cand.tiao;. 
of Ecooom>C Pcogm; m Agci.,ltm (Nogyo Sinpo no Shojokeo) ," Nogyo 
Soga K'.okyo, I (Oct 1948), pp !03 137. 
p., cap>ta nati。no!income c;timatc foe Japan,1878-1882 t。19231927 
hmd on the national moomc data a; oollooted by tho a"1hm (Seo 
App.,dix C to th≫ pap") .,d Population d"a from the B'"k 。fJopan. 
Huad"d Ym Stat"''" of t均eJnpαwe Eooaemy (Heape SheyοKe1;;:a1 
fok .. ) (1966), pp.12 13. 
Time mies, 1950-1,958 "timale of pee copita loo。mebmd '" tho 
n•tlml moome data '" U.N, Ycorbook of Nolwaal Accoua" Stat『8llC8
(1963) ,pp. 3-297, and Popul•tioo dota from U.N, Domos'"P'" Y<o,book 
(1962) ,pp 130 141 
a) F"""' ia pamthms indicata the amage。£ 1923 1927. while 
figms Mt fo parenthes" rnd>oate the amage of 1878-1927. 
b) NatioMI iaoomes in 1958 '"" oomrt•d i•to US dollacs mth the 
help of pmhasiog panty rateo '"d th" d.,ided by the mid yeac popubtio~ 
to ohtoia poc capita mome 
o) !meted ，~100 U.S. dollm io 1949 pcim （ ~125 dollm lo 1958 
pekes) iato E(r） ~I3/(r十13)
d) 245 fotmatioll'l U•its of Coli• Cluk~420 U.S. dollm ;, 1958 pnm. 
quo"d '"' Agcicnltm '"d EcoMm>< G＇。wth'Japon', Expe<0m(≪) 
Ohkawa, K, J。hnst。n,/B,Kaneda, H, Pcm<elon/Tokyo, U.目p'1970 p 120. ．
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the food consumption of the rural populat10n, and on the mcome 
・elasticity of demand for food of the rural population The demand 
for Q, the food. consumption of the urban population Cu, depends 。nthe absolute level of the per田 pitafood consumption of the 
urban population, and the income elasticity of demand for food of 
the urban population. G四日1these values, the total volume of 
trade, T, 1s determined by the size of the rural population, p, the 
total demand for food of the urban populat10n, Cu, is determined 
by the size of the urban populat10n, Pu Keeping 0 and c unchanged, 
.cbanges m P., r., change the total trade volume, T, e.g., as P, 
increases the total consumption of the rural sector mcreases, 
consequently, the trade volume T increases Similarly, the total 
food consumpt10n of the urban population, Cu, changes as P弘
changes, e g., keeping Cu constant an mcr・田町 inthe urban popul-
.ation, rpu increases the total demand for food of the urban population. 
To this writer’s knowledge we do not have empirical data for 
・the absolute levels of the per capita food consumption and the 
income elasticities of demand for food for the two categories rural 
. and urban population for the Europ田ncountries or the United 
States during the 19th c田1tury. Some indirect indication of the 
-ch田gesin the demand for food in the two categories might be 
provided by comparing the primary costs and the PTD (processing, 
transportation, distribution）ーcomponent in the total expenditures 
for food. Changes in the share of the PTD-component might be to 
some extent propo此ionateto changes in the share of Cu The 
.empirical approximation is of a rough nature since the PTD-comp-
. onent also mcludes processing costs, and for the proportionality to 
. Cu mamly the costs for the transportat10n and distribut10n are 
relevant. (Increased processmg might also reflect the trend from 
:rural to urban consumption, but mcreased processmg of food will 
be carried out to some extent also for the food of the rural con-
ュsumption.〕 Empiricaldata for Sweden and the United States show 
-1hat the share of the primary costs of food m consumer expendi -
7 
tores declined far more consistently and sharply than the share of 
the PTD component m total expenditures on food consumption. 
The ratio of fi田 lcosts to primary input rose m Sweden from 1871-
1880 to 1921-1930 from 1. 40 to 1. 89, and in the United States 
from 1869 to 1919-1929 from 1. 41 to 1. 79〔22). The primary input 
into food, largely the part received by the agncultural sector, 
accounted for a sharply declining proportion of consumer expendit-
ures while the PTD-compon四taccounted for a nsing share of 
consumer expenditures (23〕.Part of the incr田 sein the PTD-comp 
anent can certainly be attributed to improvements m quality of 
food achieved while the per capita income increased. However, 1t 
can also be expected that a significant share of the PTD・component 
went into costs of transportation and distribution This bemg the 
case, we田nconclude that the urban populat10n accounted for a 
slower declme in the rat10 of the ratio of the per capita food 
.consumption on the per capita total consumption. The income 
elasticities of demand for food阻 nbe expected to be higher m the 
urban 町田Sthan in the ru四l町田s It follows that the p町田pita
food consumption of the rural population, increased slower than 
the per回目taconsumption of the urban 町田， asp町田.pita
mcome increased. This difference is furthermore ac沼田tuatedby 
士hefact that the per capita incomes in the Europ田ncountnes m 
the 19th century tended to increase faster m the urban 町田sth副
主heydid in the rural ar田 s. As a result, the share of the total 
food consumption on the total consumption is to decline slower if 
migration from rural 町田sto urban 町田Stakes place The per 
capita trade margin, q, which is provided by the agricultural sector, 
is favorョblyeffected by a faster declme m the relative share of the 
per capita food consumption. Since the part of the population 
engaged in agricultural activities was, despite its relative decr<田町民
until the end of the 19 th century in Europe, considerably larger 
than the part of the urban population, (24), the overproportionate 
incr回目 m Cu seems to have been easily compensated for by 
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mer，白sesm T. In mterpreting these results, however, a cautious 
attitude is advisable. If we are aware of the relatively constant 
share of the food consumption on the total. consumption over the 
19th century-given the dominance of the 四国Ipopulation over 
the urban population-it has to be assumed that also the ru阻l
population must have devoted a considerable share of the total 
expenditures to food consumption. It is advisable to resist the 
temptation to present a smooth thesis that mainly a decrease in c 
accοunted for a decrease in q, and, thus, for the satisfaction of 
the increased urban demand for food which occured in Europe over 
the last 150 y回目. Indeed, the changes in p are likely to have 
accounted much more significantly for the mcrease in q than the 
curtailment of the food consumpt10n of the rural part of the 
population. 
Analysing the relative changes in c and q m LDCs and comparing 
them with early European development experience, it is necessary 
for a balanced view to recall the levels of the absolute values to 
which these relative changes apply. Smee c 1s inversely related to 
the per capita mcome, we can expect the share of c on the total 
consumer e玄pend1turesto be higher m LDCs than m Europe m the 
18th叩 d19th century, because their absolute levels of per capita 
income compare unfavorable with those of Europe. Since p is 
related to the p町田.pitaincome of the rural population, p will be 
equally low, and q being the difference between c and p, the 
absolute level of q will be low. 
The capacity of c to decline relative to p is given by the income 
elasticity of c. Some general information about the income elasticity 
of c can be obtamed from the overョ1elasticiticies of the per capita 
total 〔四国land urban) food consumption since the share of the 
agricultural population is very large. Thus, it is to conclude that 
income elasticities declme rather fast at a very low level of the 
per白.pitamcome, later level of, and almost stagnate回目mgthe 
absolute level of the per capita food consumption to increase prop-
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ort10nate!y to the mcrease in the p町田pitaincome. The crucial 
question is, whether in LDCs the initial drop in the mcr田町 ofthe 
per cap比五 foodconsumption of the agricultural population is suffi-
cient to contribute to a significant mcrease m the per目別tatrade 
mar：宮inq as measured in terms of c. Empirical evidence suggests 
that only a few LDCs are moving on this path while the lar耳e
maiority of the LDCs, particularly the poorest countries, could not 
achieve a breakthrough m the provision of q. The decisive田.uses
of this outcome回ncertainly not solely be attributed ta unfavorable 
factors an the consumption side, but lie as well an the side of the 
production which could not keep pace with the rapid incr＇田sesin 
population There are, however, vanous factors detrimental to an 
increase in q also on the side of c and c.. At first sight it looks 
hke a simple calculation that if the mcr，田町sm c declme more 
rapidly than the mcreas田 inCu, there should be a good chance to 
meet the demand for c. by the relative excess amount of c, more 
so as the rural population represents the larger part of the total 
population. The average・ food exp田 clituresas a perc田 tageaf the 
total expendit町田町民 indeed,considerably higher m rural ar・但S
than in urban ar田s. The differences in the .departing pomts of 
the absolute levels of the per capita consumption, thus, confirm 
the differences m the declme of the r田pectiveshares of the food 
consumption叩 thetotal per回目taconsumption Einpincal data, 
e. g., for the ECAFE-countnes, show that the average food ex-
penditures as a percentage of total expenditures were in rural 町田S
considerably higher than m urban areas. 
However, these empirical data appear in their proper proportion 
only if we give up the implicit assumption of mcome parity between 
urban and m悶1areas, and consider that the diffe問ncesin the shares 
of f。adconsumption are themselves a result of the gr＇田tdifferences 
in the income levels of the urban and rural areas. Outstanding 
examples are位百四sesof Thailand and the Phihppin田 wherethe 
ave問geurban income as percentage of the average rural income 
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Table 11: Selected ECAFE countries Household food expenditures 
relative to total household expenditures 
Percentage of 
~；Pe;:J;~u food households res with food 
Country Year as percentage expenditure 
of total ratio higher 
expenditures than the 
average 
Ind・ Rural 1963/64 70.l 74 
ia: Urban 1963/64 59.6 69 
Rural 1964/65 81. 3 91 
Ind ・ Urban 1964/65 77. 2 45 
Korea, Republic of 1967 51. 5 67 
Pak t Rural 1965 65.3 87 
s an: Urb 1965 51. 0 93 an 
Phi日ppines 1965 53.7 86 
Sn Lanka 1963 56.2 72 
Japan 1964 ・34. 0 62 
Source: Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Far East, 
quoted in: ECAFE, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far 
East, op. cit ,p. 125. 
was 304 (1962〕and251 (1965〕respectively(see Table 12). 
The picture, now becomes quite gloomy when evaluatmg the 
potential capacity to accomplish an mcrease m q. The relative 
decrease in c might be larger than the relative decr曲目 m Cu; but 
the relatively greater changes in the growth of the rural per capita 
food consumption apply to considerably lower absolute levels of the 
per capita food consumption, and, thus, are outweighted by the 
multiplicatory effect of the low rural per capita incomes The 
slower incr，曲目 inthe per capita food consumption of the urban 
population is compensated for by the high absolute level of its per 
capita food consumption yieldmg an incr曲目 inthe absolute per 
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Table 12 : Incop1e disparities between urban and rural sectors 
in selected ECAFE countries 
Percentage of Average urban 
population in income as 
Country urban areas percentage of 
(1960) average rural 
income 
lndia (1961/62) 14 176 
Indonesia, excluding Djak~rta 
(1964/65) 12 137• 
Java-Madura (1967) 16 133a 
Philippines (1965) 1 7 251 
S"i Lanka (1963) 12 189 
Tliailand (1962) 9 304 
Japan (1963) 46 106 
United States (1959) 68 150 
????????????????????? ?????????
????
?
?
， ?
?
??
?
?
＝
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
??
?
?
・capita food consumpt10n, Lieu, possibly higher than. the mcrease in 
the absolute t四 demargin, Liq, Llcu>Llq. In the discussion of the 
European case we did not explic1tly mention the disparities in the 
increase in population between urban and rural ar田 S It did effect 
the trade volume, T, but not to an extent that statements about q 
would be invalid in their basic cont田 tas the r田pect1vestructure 
・of population changed This is not true for the LDCs. The dis・ 
parities in the changes of the urban and rural population are con” 
siderable and determine the proportion of T and Cu to a greater 
・ext田tthan do changes in c and c.. The average percentage 
mcn田 sem population in the ECAFE countries between 1970 and 
1980 will amount to 4. 1 in urban areas and to 1. 5 m rural areas, 
and from 1980 to 2000 to .3 6 in urban areas and tf 0. 3 in rural ar.白 s.
The rapid incr田町田the urban population accompamed by higher 
absolute levels and higher rates of change in the p町田pitaincomes 
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Table 13: Total urban and ・rural population estimates and 
・Project10ns, countries of the ECAFE region, 
1970~2000 
F叩＂loti叩（th°""nd)
U<bnn R0<al 
Avmgo Avmgo Avmgo 
Co"ntry• Total mcrom N"mbor % incroa" N"mbor % mmm 
and yoar （%） （%） （%） 
ECAFE rogion 
1970 1, 994, 301 507, 455 25 4 1, 486, 846 74. 6 
1980 2, 496, 108 2. 2 737, 071 29. 5 4 1 1, 759, 037 70. 5 1. 5 
2000 3, 5£8, 468 1 6 1, 561, 491 43. 8 3. 6 2, 006、977562 0.3 
Asian part 
i97o y;・97正537一一－：－－ 1詞λ6l五5.-o・ ．← 1,481，田6.75.0 
1980 2, 472, 908 2.2 720, 538 29 4 4 1 1, 752, 370 70. 6 !. 5 
2000 3, 535, 692 1.6 1, 537, 012 43 5 3 6 1,9唱8,680 56 5 0.3 
Omnia part 
1970 18, 764 12, 994 70:2 5, 770 29. 8 
1980 23,200 2.2 16, 533 71. 3 2.4 6, 667 27. 7 1.5 
2000 32, 776 1 4 24,479 74. 7 1.7 8, 297 25 3 0.8 
Source.“Demographic 'ituation m the ECAFE rogi師”， POPI APC 2/BP /!, report by 
the ECAFE "cretariat, October 1972 
Note. Becau<e of roondmg, total' are not m al cam the '"m of the part' 
a Count≪" of the '"bregions of the ECAFE regioo are 
Mrunland and other. Ch•na, Hong Kong, ~fo,goha, Democrat.c Pe。ple’s
Republic of Koreo and Republic of Kor" 
Middle South Asiao Afghanistan, Bhutan, lndrn, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Sn Lanka 
South E"t As出 Brunei0 B0<ma，盟国orRepublic, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Phihppmes, Singapore, Thailand, Republic 
of Viet・Nam and Demoorahc Republic of Viet Nam. 
Other Omnia・ Bntish Solomon ・Isfands, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, 
Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Western Sam。a
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will lead-despite the lower income elasticities-to a considerable 
increase in C,. We are apt to expect a decrease in the rural 
population as a counterpart of the incr回 sein the urban population. 
However, the difference in the migration equation does not ev印
equal zero. Indeed, the tiny figures of 0. 3% which stands for the 
ave回geincr曲目 inthe rural population from 1980 2000 drastically 
spells out the difference between the European experience and 
the situation of the LDCs today. While in Europe the increases in 
population were at least absorbed by the mcr田singurban population, 
and the rural population was decreasing in absolute terms m the 
long run, (see Table 13; the absolute number of workers m agriculture 
can be taken as approximately proportionate to the rural populat10n), 
Table 14 : Absolute Number of Workers m Agriculture in Great 
Britain, France, and Japan 1831-1931 
Britain” France Japan 
Year (in millions) (m millions) (in 1000’s) 
1831 1. 8 
1841 1. 9 
1851 2. 1 
.1861 2.0 
1871 1. 8 
1881 1. 7 
1891 1. 6 
1901 1. 5 
1911 1. 6 
1921 1. 4 
1931 1. 3 
01872 
O O Forestry and fishmg mcluded 
4.8 
5.0 
5.3 
5.34 
5.28 
5.47 
5.04 
5. 52 
5. 33 
4. 99 
4.45 
14, 000" 
15, 810 
16, 784 
16, 799 
15, 824 
14, 271 
14,217 
Sources: For Great Britain Phyllis Deane and 百Ii.A.Cole, 
S.oo•·oes For Great Britam: Phylli' Deone ond WA. Cole. 
Bdti<h Economic Growth 1688-1959 (Cambridge, University 
Press, 1962), Table 31, p 143 
For Fronce: J.C .Toutain, Le pr。duitde l’agrioulture de 1700 
'1958,11 (Paris, 1961), 200 201. 
For Japan: K Ohkowa, The Growth Rate of the Japanese 
Economy sinoe 1878 (Tokyo, 19.57), p. 240 246 
quoted in. Hoselitr, B, Advonoed and Underdeveloped Countries: 
A Study in Development Controsts, op cit p 34 
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the rural populat10n m the LDCs increases as the data for the 
ECAFE countries exemplify. 
It is evident that addit10nal incr曲 sesin the rural population 
fnrther deteriorate the land man-ratio and put pressure on the 
increase of p, and, consequently on the increase in q On the other 
hand, additional 芦田sureis put on the trade volume, since the 
additional rural population will incr田sethe volume of the total 
food consumption. In a nutshell, the differences in the changes of 
the per capita values do not necessarily compare unfavorably with 
those of the European countries in the 19th century; this is true 
even if we allow for lower absolute per capita values The mam 
difference lies m the absolute level and the rate of change of the 
population as they effect p, q and T, C and Cu. 
5. The discussion about the empmcal behavior of c and c，ιhas 
necessarily to be supported by empirical evidence which can be 
provided for T. Indeed, rather than from the thicket of tricky 
figures on consumption and changes in the production fnnct10n, the・ 
empirical pictures becomes m1mediately transparent when we 
compare the overall performance of T of the European countries in 
the 18 th and 19 th目 nturyand the LDCs today. If we write 
T=C.+X-M, 
the performance of T can be evaluated by the behavior of the 
variables X (exports〕andM (imports〕.X>M indicates a trade 
volume capapable of supporting the rural and urban population as 
well as of contributing to the fmancmg of the economic development 
process , X <M mdicates a failure in providing enough food for the 
rural and/or urban population usmg capital from other sectors, 
古田inlythe mdustrial sector. 
European economic history gives an impressive report on agricul-
tural self-sufficiency In its early stages of economic development 
no European country relied h田町lyon imports of agricultu四l
goods. Even England and Japan were not heavily dependent on 
agricultural imports in the imtial stages of their economic develop・ 
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ment The transition from the agncultural sector to non-agncultural 
sec to四 wasmainly accomplished by constant increases m the volume 
of the surplus of the domestic agricultu田1secto巳 T.
The situation in contemporary LDCs is different. Most of the 
LDCs depend on food imports indicating that the total t四devolume 
is too small to meet the demand for food of the non-agricultural 
population or even negative, M>T, a田 sewhere the imports 
exceed the demand for food of the non-agricultural populat10n 
contnbutmg in addition to the nutritional needs of the 四国lpopul-
ation. In the田 sewhere agricultu四limports田 nnotbe .paid by 
respective exports, are not granted as aid, or are curtailed m order 
to secure imports of industrialized goods, the population suffers 
from a food deficit. “It is disturbing'', the most 目白ntECAFE-
report states，“that, in a number of developing ECAFE-countries, 
between one-quarter and one-third of households回 nbe considered 
undernourished”（24〕. Developing areas untouched by the“Green 
Revolution" face an even more severe situation in accomplishing 
the mm1mum nutritional standards. 
VI. Impact of the volume of the agricultural trade volume 
on the capital formation and the emergence of markets 
1. Departing from the conclusions of the preceding chapters the 
role wbich the agricultural sector plays in the process of economic 
development must be expected to be quite diffe回ntin the European 
countries of the 18th and 19th century and the LDCs today. It 
will suffice m this paper to refer to two factors which contribute 
to economic development : capital formation and emergence of. 
market act1v1ties-bemg well aware of numerous other important 
determining factors whose impact on the overall performance of 
the economic development process 1s positively related to the per-
formance in the agnc叫tu四lsector. 
2. The theoretical framework for the relationship between capital 
accumulation and agncultural trade margin is given by 
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K’＝θT 
where k’1s the amount of capital available from the agricultural 
sector. If we write for the provision of cap1fal for the non agricul • 
tural (mamly industrial〕sector
K，~白’k’
or K，＝θ”T’ 
then we c間 defmethe contribution of the agricultural sector to 
the industrial output, O,, as 
0,=a K, 
where I/a stands for the capital output coefficient. Differentiating 
w似1respect to time we get 
dO, dK.- da --'-=aー とー＋Kdt dt ' dt . 
If we assume no drastic change m the capital output ratio we 
see that副1increase m O, is mainly determined by an mcrease in 
K, Assurr 
K，＝θ，T we have 
dO, d61 "T 
I「＝a---;it一
in di田tingthat an mcr，田sem the industrial output 1s proport10田tely
related to an increase m the volume of trade provided by the 
agricultural output. 
The followmg discussion will provide some empirical evidence that 
d61”T 
dt 
contributed to the mcrease in the output of the industrial sector 
in European countries durmg the early phases of economic develop・ 
ment while it does not or does only to a smaller extent in LDCs today-
an emp1ri田lresult which confirms the precedmg conclusions 
3. The supply of capital is provided by the agricultural and non・ 
agricultu四1sectors. The proportion of the agricultural capital supply 
will be the larger, the larger the share of the agricultural sector on 
the total economy Thus. the dependence on the capital supply of the 
agricultural sector will generally be higher the lower the level of 
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the per capita incomes This thesis is well suppor;ti d by the fact 
that late comers in economic developnient depend more heavily 
on agricultural capital supply as well as on pressure by the state 
to force the food consumption of the population to remain on the 
subsistence level squeezing out the last drop of agricultural s山下，1us
in order to secure some of the most urgently needed non-agricultural 
investments or to accomplish an industrialization program. 
Russia and Japan are examples. In Russia two of the main pre-
cond1t1ons of the mdustnahzation were the emancipation of the 
farmers (about 1860), and the establishment of a new tax system 
(about 1880〕whichabsorbed the mcreased agricultural surplus 
enabling the state to actively suppo同 investmentactivities in the 
mdustrial sector(25). In Japan the government siphoned off a 
substantial, part of the increasing income of the Japanese farmer 
for industrial and social overhead investment; the Japanese state 
counted for about 30%, of the total gross domestic fixed capital 
formation during the y回目 afterthe MEIJI -Restoration, an amount 
which rose to about 40% for the period 1887-1936〔26）目 Thereliance 
of the econorny on the agricultural sector bemg the higher the 
lower the p町田pitamcome, Western Europe was less dependant 
on the direct impact of a high capital flow from the agricultural 
sector to the other sectors. In France in the 1860's about 15% 
came from taxes on the land and the role of the state m promoting 
industry ・ was of minor impo仕ancecompared with that of Russia 
and Japan(27) The role the net savings of the agricultural sector 
played in fmancing economic development seems to be lowest in 
Britain, the l白 derin industrialization at that time(28). The modest 
contribution the agricultural sector made m financmg the industri -
ahzation m Western Europe was to a great extent the result of the 
mcreased capital formation m the agricultural sector itself which 
lead to the described mcr田 S田 inagricultural productivity releasmg 
agricultural labor to new mdustrial activities. 
The picture in LDCs is in one respect quite similar to that iust 
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sketched ・ the lower the per capita incoII¥e the stronger proves te> 
be the reliance on agricultu四lnet savings and on governmental 
mtervention in order to provide compensat10n for the msuff1cient 
private capital supply. The picture is, however, in another respect 
different from European experience ・ the low income countries of 
Europe had already at that time a per capita income which enabled 
them to pursue a policy of keeping down the per capita mcomes on 
a levewhich was considered a“tole四.ble”subsistancelevel, while such 
a policy seems not to be feasible in. LDCs in the light of postulates 
of hum阻止yand equality as well as economic efficiency since und • 
emourished labor c叩 hardlycontribute to an mcrease m agricultural 
or mdust 口alproductivity. Furthermore, the prospects for increasing 
the long run productivity of the agricultural sector were probably 
better in the late comer countries of the now industrialized countries 
than they are in the poorest LDCs, e g., in India or countries of 
Africa As a result a governmental policy based on creating an 
agricultural surplus as a means of stimulating industrial activities 
is hardly a feassible concept of economic policy for most of the. 
LDCs today. Indeed, it seems to be the other way round the 
European experience the mdustrial sector is rather to finance the 
agricultural sector than ta be financed by the agricultural sector. 
This is certainly true for countries where the export sector is very 
profitable, e g , in oil exporting countries, and the balance of trade 
surplus is bemg channeled mto industrial and agricultural investment 
as well. It might be equally true for the mtemal宜owof resou回目
m countries where the foreign investment sector is strong, or the 
mdustrial sector claims for a relatively high fraction of the total 
production. The governmental policy of fmancing development is, 
therefore, not mainly oriented around taxing mcomes from the 
agricultural sector to support mvestment in the industrial sector, 
but taxing the mdustrial sector to contribute to the mcrease of the 
productivity of the agricultural sector. This general line of causes 
demonst四testhe basic difference m the pattern of development 
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financing between the now industrialized countries during their 
曲rlyindustrialization period and the LDCs today. The agricultu四1
sector depended also in Europe from time to time on the non’ 
agricultural sector; e g, in Bntam from 1790 to 1814 the flew of 
r田ourceswas probably toward the land〔29). In the overall picture, 
however, the reliance of the agricultu四lsector on external financialニ
r田ourceswas never so dominant m the early phase of economic 
development m Europe and Japan than it 1s m most of the LDCs. 
today. 
4. The emphasis on capital formation is in the traditi叩 ofthe 
HARROD・DOMAR model. To be sure, there are numerous other 
development vanables related to the performance of the agricultural 
sector. One of these, mentioned as the second variable at the 
begmnmg, is the impact of agricultural productivity on the emer・ 
gence of markets. Increases in agncultural productivity stimulated 
increases m the rural mcomes and the demand for industnal or 
other non ・agncultu四1goods, and contribute to a climate favorable 
for the rise of entrepreneunal activities. 
The supply and responsiveness of the entrepreneurs, of course, 
are not only 1「elatedto the land ・man－四tlo They are-m terms of 
our model to a considerable extent exogenous variables determined 
by factors, like cultural, sociological, ethical, rehg10us and mstitu-
t10nal settings for which the theoretical basis developed he回 does
not provide any explanation. However, an important indication of 
how entrepreneunal activities depend on agricultural productivity 
is provided by the fact that m阻.Iartisans played a crucial role in 
the early phases of European as well as Japanese economic develop-
ment. Professor HISAO OTSUKA suggests in his intriguing article 
“The Market Structure of Rural Industry in the Early Stages of 
the Development of Modern Capitalism" to bestowing on the econ-
omic activities of the rural artisans the rank of the decisive 
explanatory vanable of the modern economic development proc白s:
“．〔the〕prosperousartisans and their economic activities were the 
百0
specifzcum, or the decisive generative power in the development of 
modem capitalism.”〔30〕.The rise in agncnltnral productivity pro-
vided the basis for an increased demand for industrial and craft 
products，百idthe rural artisans and craftsmen, stimulated, in turn, 
an increase in the agricultu回ltrade volume and agricultural pro-
ductivity by their higher profits and their incre沼田 inthe number 
of people engaged in artisan’s activities, which both were powerful 
forces on the side of demand for agricultural products. Based on 
this mte町elatedr官邸 ofagricultural and artisan’s activities, a new 
type of economic mstitut1on, the “local market 町田”， camemto 
bemg(31〕.The er白 t10nand spread of“local market areas”田n
only be thought of fo the context of an incr＇田sem the agricultural 
productivity and the agricultural trade margm. Once the agricultural 
surplus was a constituent part of the system It first initiated, and 
later perpetuated a process of circular causation :the class of craftsmen 
and artisans were not only a product of the cr阻 t10nof a tradeable 
agricultural surplus, but contributed themselves, once they came 
into existence, to the accumulation of (particularly fixed〕capital
Sir JOHN R. HICKS suggests that出eincrease m the range and 
variability of fixed田 pitalgoods used m product10n, otherwise than 
in trade, constitutes in the late 18th century in Europe the begin-
ning of what we cal industrialization today 〔32〕．
In LDCs the industrial sector is not necessarily developing on the 
lme of a“natural balance-of-growth-relationship" well in accord with 
the agricultu四lsector The term“dualism”i mplies that there is 
some degree bf unrelatedness between the two sectors besides their 
quantative disproport10nality An ・old industrial or craft sector does 
either not exist or is comparatively small Under these cond1t10ns 
the basis from where the“new”entrepreneurial class can emerge 
is narrow目 Thereare, of course, numerous factors responsible for 
the sluggishness with which artisan’s activities come about，“pre-
newtonian" technology as well as ngid social structures. The lo胃
productivity m the agricultural sector, however, is the determinmg 
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variable which pe叩etuatesthe existence of this fundamental econ-
omic relationship ; the agricultural sector absorbs a large part of 
potential entrepreneurs and its low per capita incomes provide a 
small basis for the demand of non-agricultural goods. Even if the 
“prime mover”（llTSUKA〕isapt旬 act,he is bound not to do so 
as long as counte四ctmg“objective”forceson the side of the 
agricultural sector prevail 
VIL Conclusions 
Economic development as a most complex pbenomenon does not 
ft mto any simple model of monocausal explanation. However, 
same explanatory variables are more important than others ; they 
may constitute a cham of四国at10nsto which mariy other variables. 
of the economic development proc田srelate. It is the implicit 
hypothesis of this analysis that population is a key va口able.Indeed, 
the comparisons between European history and the contemporary 
situation of the LDCs lucidly demonstrate the pivotal role of the 
populat10n variable as push or 曲目tardationfactor m economic 
development. The respective diffe目nceshave two features . first, 
the relative changes of the population are larger in LDCs today・ 
than they were in Europe at the time of its industrialization, sec-
ondly, the absolute mittal values of the populat10n as related to the・ 
available land to which these relative changes apply are considerably 
larger in LDCs today than they were in a similar development 
phase in .Europe. Given the prevalence of the law of decreasing 
returns, under the conditions of a deteriorating land-man一回tiochan-
ges in the population determine to a large extent the increases in 
the agricultural p町田pitaproduction目 This,in tum, has repercus-
s10ns, on the trade margin of the agricultural sector, which pro-
portionatly brings about exchange activities between the agricultural. 
and non-agricultural secto四， enablesnon-consumptive capital for-
n祖tionm both secto四， andiniates changes in the behav10r of 
crucial economic agents, such as entrepreneurs and the state, which_ 
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remforce the process of continuous and cumulative gowth launched 
by agricultural productivity. 
Nevertheless, the lamentation about the insufficient supply of 
entrepreneurs and other (particularly administrative〕development
agents di問ctly田 usedby detrimental social structures and static 
-cultural settings has a core of truth. Differences of this kind, 
however, do not reflect the basic differences m the development 
1latterns nor do they explain the basic development problems of 
the LDCs today. I am in agreement with RANIS and FEI that 
there is (as far as these factors are concerned〕afeasibility of 
telescoping European expenence to contemporary developmg non 
Western countries The question more specifically asked is: How much 
・of European expenence can be repeated in LDCs today-a 
question as important as the one of whether or not it回nbe done 
'at al. This pinpoints the basic difference between the two devel-
-0pment patterns : the difference in the quality of the “exogenous” 
・Or“given”variables which are underlymg the functioning of the 
1lrocess of economic development. It might well be that the deveト
opment“mechamsm”obeys umform“economic laws" and that the 
.economic agents as the generating force in this mechanism are 
basically the same m Wes tern and non Western countri田， butthat 
the scarcity of inputs may block the well functioning of this 
宜iechamsm.We could extend this argument with reflections on the 
world ・wide situat10n with regard to non renewable recources and 
・the limiting capacity of the聞社hto absorb pollution(33〕 Such a 
view could be integrated into a production function of the whole 
-economy and supplement the long-run view of the agncultural 
~production function 
Considenng a gloomy outcome of further mvestigation in these 
.development determinants, we回 n・release some of our hesitat10ns 
to draw conclusions with regard to some pol!cy recommendat10ns 
.on the ground of our modest theoretical and empirical framework. 
'The first policy recommendation is as trivial as crucial : Limitmg the 
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focrease m population No further comment on this policy issue is 
necessary. The second policy recommendation lacks equally the坦air
-0f the revolutionary, but it is less unequivocally agreed upon . Heavy 
emphasis on modernizing agriculture rather than thmking in terms 
of Pittsburgh. This conclusion might cont阻dietconch担旧nsderived 
from short and medium-run investment criteria. However, in the 
light of the vigorous impact of the productivity of the agricultural 
sector on other key variables of the economic development process, 
short and medium-run e-0st benefit-calculations have to be an 
mtegral part of a long-nm development concept-ignoring here 
KEYNES's dictum that we are al dead m the long run 
Appendi玄： The theoretical relationship between growth of 
population and per capita income 
A simple theoretical exposition of the relationships between 
population and per capita income in aggregate terms shall be given 
in this appendix. (34) 
1. The absolute level of p町田pitaincome (I〕isdefined by the 
level of the natmnal product (0), and the level of total population 
(P), thus 
I~♀ 
Simple as this formula is, we can draw from it the important con-
dusion that I isfoversely related to P, IaP. The higher the level 
of total population at a given level of total natmnal product the 
lower the per capita iocome. Since the level of I effects important 
e口onomicgrowth va口ables,P effects important ee-0nomic growth 
variables. 
2. The above relationship reflects a static picture. I, however, is 
growmg as time pass田 m both the European countries in their 
preiodustrialization phase and in the LDCs today. Growth of I, or, 
correspondmg changes in 0 and/or P, we回nexpr<田sm the form 
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O+LfO I +Lf I ~ P+LIP 
and for the incr白 sein I 
O+LIO 0 LII~~一一P +LIP P 
3. Smee we are interested in the growth patterns over a Jong time 
span, 1t is useful to differentiate the equation with respect to 
time, so that we get the average and inst加 taneousrates of change 
over the period investigated 
The average rate of change of income回 nbe written as 
LI I 1 I 0 +LIO 0 ¥ 
7τ＝ー「l下平Lfp--p)
and the instantaneous四te.of change as 
dO dP P ーOdl dt dt 
-dt－~一一P＇一一一
The former express10n 1s convenient for statistical computation 
We can write 止t~t，ーt,, where the subscript stands, e g., for one 
lI 
Y白r目 Sincethe periods we use for our comparisons ofTtare very 
Jong, we might wish to be more explicit wi_th regard to the average 
rate of change and express the average rate of change of I over 
the whole time span as 
n 
L: a, 
i=l 
n 
AI where a, stands for四teof change of I in y田 rI，寸f-,and n for 
- i 
the number _of y阻rs.The second formula is convenient ・for a theore-
tical description of the two key四口ables. We see from this for-
dP 
mula that if the rate of change of populat10n，一証f’1slarge, the 
dl 
四teof change of per白血回 mcome,dt’ will be low or even 
dO 
negative if the四teof change of the total national productぺit• is 
not sum口entlylarge to compensate. Negative rate of I means 
decr回目 inI, a田 seof which was Indonesia in the early 1960’s. 
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It follows from the fo口nulathat both the rate of change of popula • 
tion and the rate of change of the national product will determine 
the四teof change of the capita income. 
4. Since for the purpose of our analysis relative changes are some 
times more import田 tthan absolute changes, we have also to 
establish briefly the theoretical basis for the study of the variables 
0, I, and P. The concept of relative changes prov，田 tobe pa此！CU・
larly useful for our pu叩osesbecause we wish to compare different 
countries at different times in history. The comparisons of absolute 
quantities poses practical problems due to the unw1eldly computa-
tions involved in larges figures weighted often in terms of different 
m田surements.Empirical data on relative changes are more striking 
visually which is an additional r＇田sonthat they are used more 
frequently; and, therefore, are more easily obtainable. We have 
O~IP 
and for the incr国間
O+LIO~ (I +Lil) (P+LIP〕
LIO= IP+ !LIP+ P Lil+ LIILIP-IP 
We write for the relative change 
LIO !LIP P Lil LIILIP 
＝ 十 ＋一一一一0 0 0 0 
and for the percentage change 
lOOLIO lOOLIP , lOOLII , lOOLIILIP 一 一一一0 P ' I ' IP 
Since the last term is the product of two small mcreases, the 
result is negligible, so we drop the last te口n;we have the percen-
tage increase of 0 become convemently to approximate to the 
percentage increase in population plus the percentage mcr，田sem 
p町田pitamcome. The percent沼eincrease of I isequal to the 
percen回geincrease m 0 minus the percentage mcr，田sem population, 
lOOLIO lOOLIP lOOLII 一一ー－0 P ' I , 
lOOLII lOOLIO lOOLIP 一一一一I 0 P , 
or r,=r，。－r.,
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where r, stands for perc四回ge change m I, r, for percentage 
change in 0, and rp for percentage change m P. 
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「人口増加と経済発展の関連性」
一－18～19世紀ヨーロッパと今日の開発途上国の比較一一
＜抄＞
クノレト・ドプファー
本論文は，初期ヨーロッパと低開発諸国，ことに今日のアジアにおける
人口変化を比較するとともに，これを農業の生産関数への様々な投入財，
特に土地と関連づけたものである。結論的には「限界収入逓減の法則」が
初期ヨーロッバにおいて影響したよりは，今日の低開発諸国での生産を大
きく抑制しており，技術的進歩は限界収入逓減を補うに足るだけのもので
ないと言えよう。 CI-W〕
結果として，ヨーロッパ，米国，オ一五トラレーシ7及び日本は，農業
部門の余剰を有L，これを工業部門における初期資本形成にふりむけたの
である。他方，今日の低開発国においては，農業部門を工業部門の財政に
ふりむけているわけではなく，時にはかえって，工業部門によって支えら
れているのである。今日の工業国では，同様に，農業余剰を工業部門の市
場提供にふりむけ，工業化の初期段階での発展に欠くべからざる，一群の
〆イナミックな要因を持たらした。今日の低開発諸国の多くには，農業部
門からの同様な推進効果は見られない。 CV-VD
今日の低開発諸国の経済発展にとって，製造部門，資源部門の開発は重
要なのではあるが，結論的に言えぽ，農業部門（低開発諸国の約70%の人
々が従事する）での生産に実質的進展がない限り，広範な経済発展はなさ
れえない。（班）
アベンディッグ凡では，人口増加と 1人当り所得の増加との理論的関連
を説明した。
（森山昭郎訳）
